Assessing end-user awareness of social engineering and phishing by Karakasiliotis,, A et al.
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Australian Information Warfare and Security 
Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 
4-12-2006 
Assessing end-user awareness of social engineering and phishing 
A Karakasiliotis, 
University of Plymouth 
S M. Furnell 
University of Plymouth 
M Papadaki 
University of Plymouth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/isw 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karakasiliotis,, A., Furnell, S. M., & Papadaki, M. (2006). Assessing end-user awareness of social 
engineering and phishing. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4225/75/57a80e47aa0cb 
DOI: 10.4225/75/57a80e47aa0cb 
7th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 4th - 
5th December, 2006. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/isw/12 





Social  engineering is  a significant problem involving technical and non­technical ploys in order to acquire  
information from unsuspecting users. This paper presents an assessment of user awareness of such methods in  
























distinguish   between   legitimate   emails   and   illegitimate   messages   that   attempt   to   employ   some   of   the 





































collected   demographic   details   about   respondents   (e.g.   gender,   age,   nationality,   education   and   employment 






























as   a   definitive   indicator   of   legitimacy.     Although   characteristics   such   as   untidy   layout   and 
typographic/grammatical errors were only observed in illegitimate messages (and could therefore be used to 
raise a recipients suspicion), their absence certainly did not mean that a message was genuine. 














lang. errors URL/ link
Purpose of message
1 Bank of America Legitimate   Notification of deposit.
2 NatWest Bank Illegitimate  Request for account verification
3 Citibank Legitimate    Opportunity to transfer credit card balances
4 Chase Credit Cards Legitimate   Opportunity to transfer credit card balances.
5 Cross Country Bank Legitimate  Request to access online account in order to retain access.
6 Halifax Bank Illegitimate   Request for account verification.
7 Lloyds TSB Illegitimate    Request for account verification.
8 CapitalOne Legitimate    Notification of account statement available for viewing.
9 Microsoft Illegitimate   Instructs recipient to download a security patch.
10 Network Solutions Legitimate   Annual confirmation request for domain name details.
11 eBay Illegitimate    Request for account verification.
12 eBay Illegitimate    Request to join eBay PowerSeller programme (sent to an unnamed recipient).
13 eBay Legitimate   Request  to  join  eBay  PowerSeller  programme (sent  to  a  named recipient).
14 WorldPay Illegitimate   Claim of chargeback made to recipient’s account.  Accompanied by a malicious executable attachment.
15 PayPal Legitimate    Notification of payment.
16 PayPal Legitimate  Request (sent to named recipient) to update card details
17 PayPal Illegitimate   Vishing scam
18 PayPal Illegitimate   Request for tsunami disaster relief donation
19 Amazon Illegitimate   Request for account verification.
20 British/Intercontinental Free Lottery Illegitimate   
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Don't Know Illegitimate Legitimate
Figure 5: Overall opinions for each of the 20 messages
The overall level of correct classification (i.e. indicating ‘legitimate’ for genuine messages and ‘illegitimate’ for 
bogus  ones)   42%,  while  misclassification  was  32%.    This,   alongside   the   additional  26% of   ‘don’t   know’ 
responses,   clearly   illustrates   the   level   of   confusion   amongst   the   participants.     Analyzing   subsets   of   the 
participants based upon the demographics we established that there were no significant differences relating to 
gender,   age,   or   nationality.     The   results   did,   however,   reveal   that   the   participants   were   more   prone   to 






Legitimate messages 36 37 27
Illegitimate messages 45 28 26
Overall 42 32 26
Table 2:  Classification of messages by participants
These findings can be compared to those from other experimental work.   For example, Robila and Ragucci 



























that   involve   asserting   authority   or   exploiting   the   recipient’s   desire   to   be   helpful   are   most   likely   to   be 
misclassified,   compared   to   those   attempting   to   exert   influence  based  upon   social   proof  or   scarcity,  which 
participants were more able to classify correctly.















There is https 
There is no https 
There is URL/Link 
There in no URL/Link 
Verification process 
Manually URL check 











Personalized email (e.g. 
recipient name)





Promoting offers / 
opportunities

Using forceful language 













and   4.     Figure   3   is   an   illegitimate   email   from  eBay  with   spoofed   email   address  (i.e.   admin@ebay.reply­





judgement  of   legitimacy or   illegitimacy.     In   some cases   (where  there  was   less   than a   two  thirds  majority 
indicated in one way or the other) the influence of the factor was considered to be mixed, and thus it does not 
have a clear role in leading participants to a legitimacy decision.  
CONCLUSION
The practical study has enabled a deeper investigation of the phenomena of social engineering through phishing 
attacks with emails, providing insight into the reasons that users become victims of such ploys. The resulting 
need for increased security awareness is clear, but the way to achieve such awareness could be a difficult process 
due to the technical unfamiliarity or the behavioural traits of each user. 
It  is recognized that our participants were only able to judge legitimacy on the basis for  the content of the 
messages, and were not able to assist their decisions by considering the context in which an email was received. 
In practice, this aspect would very often aid a decision.   For example, if a message asking for verification of 
account details was received from a bank with which the recipient was not a customer, then this would typically 
be a good indication that the message was bogus.
Another limitation in this study was that the candidate messages inter­mixed the different factors of interest (e.g. 
use of visual indicators, styles of language, and technical cues).   A more specific study of the influences that 
each of these aspects may hold could be achieved if participants were specifically instructed to consider them in 
isolation (i.e. purely based on the appearance of the message, is it legitimate or illegitimate?).   As such, this 
represents a potential aspect of future research.  However, possibly the most important near­term priority for the 
industry in general is to ensure adequate awareness of, and action against, the phishing threat.   This not only 
applies to end­users who may receive the messages, but also the organizations that may find their brand being 
hijacked. 
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